The view that acting morally is ultimately a question of treating others with respect has had a profound influence on moral and legal philosophy. Not surprisingly, then, some scholars forcefully argue that the modes of punishment that the states mete out to offenders should not be disrespectful, and, furthermore, it has been argued that obliging offenders to receive neurological treatment is incompatible with showing them their due respect. In this paper, I examine three contemporary accounts of what showing respect for offenders in our sentencing practices would amount to: that it involves not interfering with offenders’ capacities for rationality and autonomy, that it should not undermine offenders’ prospect of reform, and that it amounts to treating offenders as if opaque. I then critically discuss whether any of these accounts plausibly imply that mandating neurointerventions to some offenders is necessarily morally wrong. I argue that they do not.

道德行为最终是一个尊重他人的问题的观点对道德和法律哲学产生了深远的影响。因此，毫不奇怪，一些学者强硬地认为，国家对罪犯的惩罚方式不应该是不尊重的，此外，有人认为，强迫罪犯接受神经治疗与向他们表示应有的尊重是不相容的。在这篇论文中，我研究了三个当代关于在我们的量刑实践中表现出对罪犯的尊重的内容：它涉及不干扰罪犯的理性和自主能力，它不应该破坏罪犯的改革前景，以及这相当于将罪犯视为不透明。然后我批判性地讨论这些说法中是否有任何一个似乎暗示对某些罪犯进行神经干预在道德上必然是错误的。我认为他们没有。