This paper examines the incentives for, and economic impact of related-party transactions (RPTs) by controlling shareholders (CSHs) of corporate groups. We analyze a theory model of RPTs transacted on ‘market terms’ by two affiliate firms in a group, one of which belongs to an upstream and the other to a downstream market. We show that RPTs of this kind, although non-advantageous to the CSH of the group in terms of transfer price, may be abusive in that they serve the interests of the CSH by sacrificing minority shareholders. This is due to the exclusive effects of such RPTs. We show that a CSH has a strong incentive to exclude upstream rivals for his/her own sake rather than the group’s when he/she is allowed to implement such RPTs. The results shed light on regulation of RPTs: distortions of RPTs arise not only from unfair transfer-pricing but also from large transaction volume. This further implies that competition policies regarding the leverage of market power and anti-competitive vertical mergers may be applied to regulate harmful RPTs.

本文研究了企业集团控股股东（CSH）对关联交易（RPT）的诱因和经济影响。我们分析了一组中的两家关联公司根据“市场条款”进行交易的RPT的理论模型，其中一个属于上游市场，另一个属于下游市场。我们显示，这种RPT尽管在转让价格上对集团的CSH不利，但在滥用RPT时会牺牲少数股东，从而为CSH谋取利益。这是由于此类RPT的排他性影响。我们表明，CSH有强烈的动机要出于自身利益而将上游竞争对手排除在外，而不是允许他/她实施此类RPT时，要排除该群体。结果揭示了对RPT的监管：RPT的扭曲不仅源于不公平的转让定价，还源于交易量大。这进一步意味着，关于市场支配力和反竞争性纵向合并的竞争政策可能适用于监管有害的RPT。