Confidence, which characterizes the feeling when people evaluate something, could influence their choices or behaviors significantly. Under the framework of evolutionary game theory, Szolnoki and Chen (Phys. Rev. E, 98 (2018) 022309) found that, both underconfident and overconfident individuals can promote cooperation in the population. In their work, underconfident and overconfident individuals are both assumed to have homogeneous confidence levels and the confidence levels remain unchanged during the whole evolutionary process. As a direct extension, in this work, we treat confidence level as an attribute of the individuals and assign each one a confidence level, which may be static or time-varied. The effects of heterogeneous confidence on cooperation in evolutionary games are investigated and two different cases are considered. For the static case, we assume that individuals' confidence levels are drawn from a uniform distribution in a certain interval. Whereas, for the time-varied case, the confidence levels of individuals can coevolve with the strategies. By numerical simulation, we find that the static heterogeneous confidence can enhance cooperation when the parameters of distribution satisfy certain conditions. Some analytic explanations based on the observations of strategy configurations among the population are provided. Furthermore, when individuals' confidence levels are allowed to coevolve with their strategies during the evolutionary dynamics, cooperation could be significantly improved. We also find that there exists an optimal increment for the confidence level which leads to the highest cooperation level.

信心是人们评价事物时的感觉特征，可能会极大地影响他们的选择或行为。在进化博弈论的框架下，佐尔诺基（Szolnoki）和陈（C. Phys。Rev. E，98）（2018）022309）发现，自信不足和过度自信的人都可以促进人口合作。在他们的工作中，自信不足和过度自信的人都被假定为具有相同的置信度，并且在整个进化过程中置信度保持不变。作为直接扩展，在这项工作中，我们将置信度视为个人的属性，并为每个人分配一个置信度，该置信度可以是静态的或随时间变化的。研究了异质信心对进化博弈合作的影响，并考虑了两种不同的情况。对于静态情况，我们假设个人的置信度是从一定间隔内的均匀分布得出的。而对于时变情况，个人的置信度可以与策略一起发展。通过数值模拟发现，当分布参数满足一定条件时，静态异构置信度可以增强协调性。提供了一些基于人口中战略配置的分析解释。此外，如果在进化动力学过程中允许个人的信心水平与他们的策略一起发展，合作将会大大改善。我们还发现，存在置信水平的最佳增量，这导致了最高的合作水平。提供了一些基于人口中战略配置的分析解释。此外，如果在进化动力学过程中允许个人的信心水平与他们的策略一起发展，合作将会大大改善。我们还发现，存在置信水平的最佳增量，这导致了最高的合作水平。提供了一些基于人口中战略配置的分析解释。此外，如果在进化动力学过程中允许个人的信心水平与他们的策略一起发展，合作将会大大改善。我们还发现，存在置信水平的最佳增量，这导致了最高的合作水平。