This paper studies the evolution of conventions in Stag Hunt games when agents’ behaviour depends on pairwise payoff comparisons. The results of two imitative decision rules are compared with each other and with those obtained when agents myopically best respond to the distribution of play. These rules differ in terms of their rationale, their requirements, and the extent to which they make individuals learn from others. Depending on payoffs and the interaction process being considered, best response learning can cause either the rewarding All Stag equilibrium or the inefficient All Hare equilibrium to emerge as the long-run convention. In contrast, pairwise imitation favours the emergence of the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. This result is robust to assuming assortative matching and some heterogeneity in decision rules.

当特工的行为取决于成对的支付比较时，本文研究了Stag Hunt游戏中约定的演变。将两个模仿决策规则的结果相互比较，并与代理商在近距离对比赛分布做出最佳反应时获得的结果进行比较。这些规则在其原理，要求以及使个人向他人学习的程度方面有所不同。根据收益和所考虑的交互过程，最佳响应学习可能会导致奖励性的All Stag平衡或效率低下的All Hare平衡成为长期惯例。相反，成对模仿有利于帕累托劣等均衡的出现。该结果对于假设分类匹配和决策规则中的某些异质性是鲁棒的。