Abstract Disequilibrium trade can occur in a market lacking both recontracting and a computational system that maps utilities into prices. This paper studies disequilibrium trade in a large market for an indivisible good. We focus on the possible speed of adjustment when arbitrage among periods is feasible and the surplus loss. We find that incentive compatible sequential trade through a disequilibrium path is only compatible with sluggish price adjustments and sufficiently impatient agents. Thus, price adjustment does not depend on excess demand alone but on arbitrage opportunities and the willingness of agents to engage on them. We find that the upper bound on the speed of price adjustment involves a lower bound for the social surplus loss, whatever the kind of rationing. The reason is that even when the market price converges to the surplus maximizing value, as it happens when rationing is efficient, some pieces of surplus are not attainable at the current period due to arbitrage. Moreover, faster price adjustments do not imply less surplus loss, because the effect of price changes on transactions via arbitrage. Finally, under weaker-than-efficient rationing there is a one period incentive compatible trading procedure in which most of the surplus is destroyed. The procedure has the property that almost every agent in the market trades.

中文翻译：

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不可分割商品在大型市场中的不平衡贸易

摘要不平衡贸易可能发生在既缺乏再合同又缺乏将公用事业映射成价格的计算系统的市场中。本文研究了一个不可分割的商品在一个大市场中的不平衡贸易。我们着重于当期间套利可行时的可能调整速度和盈余损失。我们发现，通过不平衡路径进行激励兼容的顺序交易仅与缓慢的价格调整和足够耐心的代理商兼容。因此，价格调整不仅仅取决于过量需求，而是取决于套利机会和代理商参与其中的意愿。我们发现，无论配给哪种形式，价格调整速度的上限都涉及社会剩余损失的下限。原因是，即使当市场价格收敛到盈余最大化值时（如配给有效时发生的情况），由于套利，在当前时期也无法获得一些盈余。而且，更快的价格调整并不意味着盈余损失会减少，因为价格变化对通过套利交易的影响。最后，在比效率弱于效率的配给中，存在一种期限激励兼容的交易程序，其中大部分盈余被销毁。该程序具有市场上几乎所有代理商交易的特性。在比效率弱于效率的配给中，存在一种期限激励兼容的交易程序，其中大部分盈余被销毁。该程序具有市场上几乎所有代理商交易的特性。在比效率弱于效率的配给中，存在一种期限激励兼容的交易程序，其中大部分盈余被销毁。该程序具有市场上几乎所有代理商交易的特性。