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Disequilibrium Trade in a Large Market for an Indivisible Good

  • Luis C. Corchón and José Rueda-Llano EMAIL logo

Abstract

Disequilibrium trade can occur in a market lacking both recontracting and a computational system that maps utilities into prices. This paper studies disequilibrium trade in a large market for an indivisible good. We focus on the possible speed of adjustment when arbitrage among periods is feasible and the surplus loss. We find that incentive compatible sequential trade through a disequilibrium path is only compatible with sluggish price adjustments and sufficiently impatient agents. Thus, price adjustment does not depend on excess demand alone but on arbitrage opportunities and the willingness of agents to engage on them. We find that the upper bound on the speed of price adjustment involves a lower bound for the social surplus loss, whatever the kind of rationing. The reason is that even when the market price converges to the surplus maximizing value, as it happens when rationing is efficient, some pieces of surplus are not attainable at the current period due to arbitrage. Moreover, faster price adjustments do not imply less surplus loss, because the effect of price changes on transactions via arbitrage. Finally, under weaker-than-efficient rationing there is a one period incentive compatible trading procedure in which most of the surplus is destroyed. The procedure has the property that almost every agent in the market trades.

JEL Classification: D410; D500; D510

Acknowlegment

We are grateful to Carmen Beviá, Bernardo Moreno and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. LC acknowledges financial support from CAYCIT (Ministry of Education of Spain) from grants ECO2017_87769_P, MDM 2014-0431 and S2015/HUM-3444. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Frank H. Hahn who taught LC his first real economic lessons and devoted part of his energy to understand this problem.

A Appendix

In this appendix we show that, under efficient rationing, every trading procedure in which prices are conveniently bounded to avoid overshooting in our discrete model, converges to the CE allocation.

Proposition A1.

For every NTA (resp. NTB), PF and ER feasible trading procedure Υ in which ptpCE (resp. ptpCE) for all t=1,,T, we have that

pT=pCE

and

t=1TBt=t=1TSt=[0,xCE]

Proof:

Assume Υ(T,{pt}t=1T,{Bt}t=1T,{St}t=1T) is a NTA feasible trading procedure satisfying PF and ER in which ptpCE for all t=1,,T. Let b_[0,1] be the consumer such that x1(b_)=inf{x1(b):bt=1TBt} and let s¯[0,1] be the seller such that q1(s¯)=sup{q1(s):st=1TSt}. As x()andq() are continuous and strictly monotone, x1() and q1() are continuous. By ER, the sets t=1TBtand t=1TSt are intervals in [0,1] and thus so the sets {x1(b):bt=1TBt} and {q1(s):st=1TSt}. Therefore, both x1(b_) and q1(s¯) are well defined. As ptpCE for all t, pT<pCE cannot hold. Suppose then that pT>pCE. By ER, we also have that b_=s¯, and therefore, x1(b_)pT>pCE>q1(s¯). But then, there exist (b,s)such thatb[0,1]τ=1TBτ,s[0,1]τ=1TSτandx1(b)q1(s), which violates condition (iv) of feasibility. Hence pT=pCE.

On the other hand, we have that b_=s¯xCE. But if b_=s¯<xCE, then we would have again that x1(b_)>q1(s¯), and thus a new violation of condition (iv) of feasibility. Therefore, b_=s¯=xCE. As t=1TBtand t=1TSt are both intervals (and markets are orderly), we have that t=1TBt=[0,]=[0,s¯]=t=1TSt=[0,xCE].

For a NTB feasible trading procedure satisfying PF and ER in which ptpCE for all t=1,,T, the proof is analogous and thus is omitted. ∎

The next result follows directly from Proposition A1 by simply adding IC to the set of properties that are satisfied by the trading procedure.

Corollary A1.

For every NTA (resp. NTB), PF, ER and IC feasible trading procedure Υ in which ptpCE (resp. ptpCE) for all t=1,,T, we have that

pT=pCE

and

t=1TBt=t=1TSt=[0,xCE]

B Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2.

For any NTA, PF and OPIC trading procedure we already know that vt>vt+1 and vt=pt+ptpt+1r, for every t.

Now, for every t such that

x1(1ε)<q1(1ετ=1t1ετ),

let

pt=q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)
Bt=[τ=1t1ετ,τ=1tετ],
St=[1ετ=1tετ,1ετ=1t1ετ],

and

εt=x(vt)x(vt1),

with ε0=0.

If, for some t,

x1(1ε)q1(1ετ=1t1ετ),

then t is the last period in which there is trade and we let

pt[q1(1ετ=1t1ετ),x1(1ε)],
Bt=[τ=1t1ετ,1ε]
St=[0,1ετ=1t1ετ]

Therefore, we can write the following algorithm that allows to compute εt at every period t in which

x1(1ε)<q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)

given the values of ε1,εt2,,ε1:

x1(τ=1t1ετ+εt)+q1(1ετ=1t1ετεt)r=q1(1εt1τ=1ετ)(1+r)r

We first show that, for every t, for which

x1(1ε)<q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)

there exists a unique εt>0 satisfying the above nonlinear equation. To prove this, we proceed by induction. Indeed, notice first that x1(1ε)<q1(1ε).

Then, when ε1=0,

x1(0)+q1(1ε)r>q1(1ε)(1+r)r

and, when ε1=1ε,

x1(1ε)+q1(0)r<q1(1ε)(1+r)r

and so, by continuity of both x1()and q1() and Bolzano’s Theorem, there exist some ε1 such that, 0<ε1<1ε, and

x1(ε1)+q1(1εε1)r=q1(1ε)(1+r)r

Now consider some period t and the t corresponding valuesεt,εt1,,ε1>0 satisfying the algorithm such that

x1(1ε)<q1(1ετ=1tετ)

and, for every t,

0<εt<1ετ=1t1ετ

Then, when εt+1=0, since εt>0,

x1(τ=1tετ)+q1(1ετ=1tετ)r=q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)(1+r)r

and q1() is strictly increasing, we have that

q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)>q1(1ετ=1tετ)

and so

x1(τ=1tετ)+q1(1ετ=1tετ)r>q1(1ετ=1tετ)(1+r)r

When εt+1=1ετ=1tετ,given that

x1(1ε)<q1(1ετ=1tετ)

And that τ=1tετ<1ε, we have that

x1(1ε)+q1(0)r<q1(1ετ=1tετ)(1+r)r

Therefore, again by continuity of both x1() and q1() and Bolzano’s Theorem, there exist some εt+1 such that, 0<εt+1<1ετ=1tετ, and

x1(τ=1tετ+εt+1)+q1(1ετ=1tετεt+1)r=q1(1ετ=1tετ)(1+r)r

To prove that the εt satisfying the above algorithm for every t, for which x1(1ε)<q1(1ετ=1tετ), is unique, it suffices to notice that, for every t, and given εt1,εt2,,ε1, the function

x1(τ=1t1ετ+)+q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)r

is strictly decreasing in εt.

To prove that there exist some t such that

x1(1ε)q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)

let H()=x1()+q1(1ε)r Since H is continuous and strictly decreasing, then it is invertible. Therefore, we can write our algorithm as

at=g(at1)

where at=τ=1tετ, for each t and g()=H1(q1(1ε)1+rr).[11] Now, notice that, since at>at1, and g()>0, a sufficient condition for a t to exist such that

x1(1ε)q1(1ετ=1t1ετ)

is that the fixed point for g() be higher or equal to 1εq(x1(1ε)).

This last condition is guaranteed by assuming that

g()1εH1(q1(1ε)1+rr)1εq(x1(1ε)),

i. e. Assumption 1.

Feasibility is trivially satisfied and so the proof is omitted.

To show that this trading procedure satisfies NTA, it suffices to notice that p1=q1(1ε)>pPCE, there is trade in the first period, and prices are always decreasing.

Finally, to show that NWR is also satisfied, it suffices to notice that both t=1TBt and t=1TSt are connected sets. Moreover, t=1TBt=t=1TSt=[0,1ε], and the proof follows. ∎

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Published Online: 2020-03-06

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