Abstract
Disequilibrium trade can occur in a market lacking both recontracting and a computational system that maps utilities into prices. This paper studies disequilibrium trade in a large market for an indivisible good. We focus on the possible speed of adjustment when arbitrage among periods is feasible and the surplus loss. We find that incentive compatible sequential trade through a disequilibrium path is only compatible with sluggish price adjustments and sufficiently impatient agents. Thus, price adjustment does not depend on excess demand alone but on arbitrage opportunities and the willingness of agents to engage on them. We find that the upper bound on the speed of price adjustment involves a lower bound for the social surplus loss, whatever the kind of rationing. The reason is that even when the market price converges to the surplus maximizing value, as it happens when rationing is efficient, some pieces of surplus are not attainable at the current period due to arbitrage. Moreover, faster price adjustments do not imply less surplus loss, because the effect of price changes on transactions via arbitrage. Finally, under weaker-than-efficient rationing there is a one period incentive compatible trading procedure in which most of the surplus is destroyed. The procedure has the property that almost every agent in the market trades.
Acknowlegment
We are grateful to Carmen Beviá, Bernardo Moreno and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. LC acknowledges financial support from CAYCIT (Ministry of Education of Spain) from grants ECO2017_87769_P, MDM 2014-0431 and S2015/HUM-3444. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Frank H. Hahn who taught LC his first real economic lessons and devoted part of his energy to understand this problem.
A Appendix
In this appendix we show that, under efficient rationing, every trading procedure in which prices are conveniently bounded to avoid overshooting in our discrete model, converges to the CE allocation.
Proposition A1.
For every NTA (resp. NTB), PF and ER feasible trading procedure
and
Proof:
Assume
On the other hand, we have that
For a NTB feasible trading procedure satisfying PF and ER in which
The next result follows directly from Proposition A1 by simply adding IC to the set of properties that are satisfied by the trading procedure.
Corollary A1.
For every NTA (resp. NTB), PF, ER and IC feasible trading procedure
and
B Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
For any NTA, PF and OPIC trading procedure we already know that
Now, for every
let
and
with
If, for some
then
Therefore, we can write the following algorithm that allows to compute
given the values of
We first show that, for every t, for which
there exists a unique
Then, when
and, when
and so, by continuity of both
Now consider some period
and, for every
Then, when
and
and so
When
And that
Therefore, again by continuity of both
To prove that the
is strictly decreasing in
To prove that there exist some
let
where
is that the fixed point for
This last condition is guaranteed by assuming that
i. e. Assumption 1.
Feasibility is trivially satisfied and so the proof is omitted.
To show that this trading procedure satisfies NTA, it suffices to notice that
Finally, to show that NWR is also satisfied, it suffices to notice that both
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