It has been shown that manufacturers can employ vertical practices and restraints to prevent entry in markets where upstream entrants require downstream accommodation. I show that if downstream product investment is important and encouraged by the restraint, foreclosing entry this way may not be credible. Additionally, publicly mandated vertical restraints and termination restrictions could prevent foreclosure, but if these restrictions reduce downstream product investment, they could have the opposite effect and decrease entry.

中文翻译：

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自愿与强制性纵向限制以及终止竞争对手对排斥竞争对手的战略影响

已经表明，制造商可以采用垂直做法和限制措施来防止进入上游进入者需要下游容纳的市场。我表明，如果下游产品投资很重要并且受到限制的鼓励，以这种方式禁止进入可能是不可信的。此外，公共强制性的垂直限制和终止限制可以防止丧失抵押品赎回权，但如果这些限制减少了下游产品的投资，则可能产生相反的效果并减少进入。