This article investigates patronage in the Second Italian Republic by considering patronage a fundamental device able to guarantee a party presence in the governance of public bodies. The study sheds light on a particular area of party patronage, namely political appointments concerning legislators; it analyzes the factors which could determine whether a member of Parliament will be appointed to a state-owned enterprise’s board of directors after a legislature, seeking to gain a better understanding of how political actors exploit this opportunity. Direct political connections can be conceptualized as instruments to control and reward politicians and/or strategies to enhance political control over the bureaucracy. The empirical investigation suggests that legislators’ efforts in Parliament play a role in the likelihood of patronage appointments. Education does not seem to significantly increase the probability of receiving a nomination for a seat on public firms’ boards, moreover our result casts doubt on the merits or competencies of the appointed politicians.

本文通过将光顾作为一种能够保证政党在公共机构治理中的存在的基本手段来研究意大利第二共和国的光顾。该研究揭示了政党庇护的特定领域，即与立法者有关的政治任命；它分析了一些因素，这些因素可以确定在立法机关成立后是否将任命一名议员担任国有企业的董事会成员，以期更好地了解政治角色如何利用这一机会。直接的政治联系可以概念化为控制和奖励政客的工具和/或增强对官僚政治控制的战略。实证研究表明，立法者在议会中的努力在接受赞助的可能性中发挥了作用。