The “tragedy of the commons” describes the depletion of resources when appropriated by a group of people acting individually. Since the phenomenon was described by Hardin (1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162, 1243–1248), scholars have agreed that the only ways to avoid depletion of resources are private ownership and external governmental control. Elinor Ostrom (2005, Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) identified a 3rd solution to the tragedy of the commons. She analyzed multiple small communities lasting hundreds and even thousands of years in which the appropriators themselves managed their common pool resources without external governmental control or privatization. Later, Ostrom developed additional principles to analyze more complex social systems. We integrate behavioral and cultural selection perspectives with her work. We analyze appropriators’ management of common pool resources in terms of metacontingencies and macrocontingencies operating within larger systems. As an illustration, we applied the integration of Ostrom’s institutional framework and culturo-behavioral selection perspectives to appropriators’ management of invasive species in an inland lake in Michigan. The appropriators were residents who formed part of a nonprofit association dedicated to sustaining the welfare of their lake. We concluded that the 2 perspectives are complementary and helpful in the management of common pool resources.

中文翻译：

---

在公共池资源管理中整合制度和文化行为分析：在密歇根州的内陆湖中的应用

“公地悲剧”描述了当一群人单独行动时资源的枯竭。自从 Hardin (1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, 162, 1243–1248) 描述了这一现象以来，学者们一致认为，避免资源枯竭的唯一方法是私有制和外部政府控制。Elinor Ostrom（2005 年，理解制度多样性，新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社）确定了解决公地悲剧的第三种解决方案。她分析了多个持续数百年甚至数千年的小社区，在这些社区中，占用者自己管理他们的公共池资源，而没有外部政府控制或私有化。后来，奥斯特罗姆开发了额外的原理来分析更复杂的社会系统。我们将行为和文化选择的观点与她的工作相结合。我们根据在更大系统中运行的元意外事件和宏观意外事件来分析占用者对公共池资源的管理。例如，我们将 Ostrom 的制度框架和文化行为选择观点的整合应用于密歇根州一个内陆湖中的入侵物种的拨款者管理。拨款者是居民，他们组成了一个致力于维持湖泊福利的非营利协会。我们得出的结论是，这两种观点是互补的，有助于管理公共池资源。例如，我们将 Ostrom 的制度框架和文化行为选择观点的整合应用于密歇根州一个内陆湖中的入侵物种的拨款者管理。拨款者是居民，他们组成了一个致力于维持湖泊福利的非营利协会。我们得出的结论是，这两种观点是互补的，有助于管理公共池资源。例如，我们将 Ostrom 的制度框架和文化行为选择观点的整合应用于密歇根州一个内陆湖中的入侵物种的拨款者管理。拨款者是居民，他们组成了一个致力于维持湖泊福利的非营利协会。我们得出的结论是，这两种观点是互补的，有助于管理公共池资源。