Integrating Institutional and Culturo-Behavioral Analyses in the Management of Common Pool Resources: Application to an Inland Lake in Michigan

Abstract

The “tragedy of the commons” describes the depletion of resources when appropriated by a group of people acting individually. Since the phenomenon was described by Hardin (1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162, 1243–1248), scholars have agreed that the only ways to avoid depletion of resources are private ownership and external governmental control. Elinor Ostrom (2005, Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) identified a 3rd solution to the tragedy of the commons. She analyzed multiple small communities lasting hundreds and even thousands of years in which the appropriators themselves managed their common pool resources without external governmental control or privatization. Later, Ostrom developed additional principles to analyze more complex social systems. We integrate behavioral and cultural selection perspectives with her work. We analyze appropriators’ management of common pool resources in terms of metacontingencies and macrocontingencies operating within larger systems. As an illustration, we applied the integration of Ostrom’s institutional framework and culturo-behavioral selection perspectives to appropriators’ management of invasive species in an inland lake in Michigan. The appropriators were residents who formed part of a nonprofit association dedicated to sustaining the welfare of their lake. We concluded that the 2 perspectives are complementary and helpful in the management of common pool resources.