We analyze a model of optimal gerrymandering in which two parties simultaneously redistrict in a competition for influence in a legislature. Parties allocate geographic blocks to districts, in which the median voter determines the winner. The form of the optimal gerrymander involves “slices” of right-wing blocks paired with “slices” of left-wing blocks, as in Friedman and Holden (Am Econ Rev 98(1):113–144, 2008 ). We also show that, as one party controls the redistricting process in more states, that party designs districts such that the most extreme districts within its control become more extreme. We show that this comparative static holds for a broad class of objective functions.

中文翻译：

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在竞争环境中的最佳Gerrymandering

我们分析了一个最佳共政模式，在该模式中，两个政党在竞争立法机构的竞争中同时重新划分区域。政党将地区分配给地区，由中位数的选民决定获胜者。如弗里德曼和霍尔顿（Am Econ Rev 98（1）：113–144，2008）一样，最优格里曼德形式包括右翼块的“切片”和左翼块的“切片”。我们还表明，当一个政党控制更多州的重新分配过程时，该政党设计的地区应使其控制范围内最极端的地区变得更加极端。我们表明，这种比较静态适用于广泛的目标函数。