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Information and Diagrammatic Reasoning: An Inferentialist Reading
Minds and Machines ( IF 4.2 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-30 , DOI: 10.1007/s11023-020-09547-2
Bruno Ramos Mendonça

In current philosophy of information, different authors have been supporting the veridicality thesis (VT). According to this thesis, an epistemically-oriented concept of information must have truth as one of its necessary conditions. Two challenges can be raised against VT. First, some philosophers object that veridicalists erroneously ignore the informativeness of false messages. Secondly, it is not clear whether VT can adequately explain the information considered in hypothetical reasoning. In this sense, logical diagrams offer an interesting case of analysis: by manipulating a logical diagram we can verify that a certain conclusion follows from a set of premises, but it cannot help us to determine the actual truth-value of a given set of propositions. Focusing on the latter challenge, in this paper I claim that logical diagrams set out potential counterexamples to VT and, consequently, pose a real challenge to this thesis. First, a veridicalist analysis of logical diagrams requires the assumption of metatheoretical properties which are not satisfied by some logical systems (and, consequently, are not satisfied by some systems of logical diagrams). So, VT does not fit well as a general framework for a theory of logical diagrammatic information. Secondly, based on semantic inferentialism, one can propose a normative interpretation of the inferential content of logical diagrams not exposed to the problems faced by VT. Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that veridicalism cannot accommodate such a normative interpretation. In other words, normativism represents a real (though still underexplored) alternative to veridicality. Due to these reasons, I conclude that, until further research, we should adopt a more parsimonious standpoint and say that logical diagrams provide inferential information simply.

中文翻译:

信息和图解推理:推理阅读

在当前的信息哲学中,不同的作者一直支持真实性论题(VT)。根据这个论点,一个以认识论为导向的信息概念必须将真理作为其必要条件之一。可以对 VT 提出两个挑战。首先,一些哲学家反对真实主义者错误地忽略了虚假信息的信息量。其次,尚不清楚VT是否可以充分解释假设推理中考虑的信息。从这个意义上说,逻辑图提供了一个有趣的分析案例:通过操作逻辑图,我们可以验证从一组前提得出的某个结论,但它不能帮助我们确定一组给定命题的实际真值. 专注于后一个挑战,在本文中,我声称逻辑图列出了 VT 的潜在反例,因此,对本文提出了真正的挑战。首先,逻辑图的真实主义分析需要假设某些逻辑系统不满足的元理论属性(因此,某些逻辑图系统不满足)。因此,VT 并不适合作为逻辑图解信息理论的一般框架。其次,基于语义推理主义,人们可以对逻辑图的推理内容提出一种规范解释,而不是暴露于 VT 所面临的问题。此外,有几个理由相信真实主义不能适应这种规范性解释。换句话说,规范主义代表了真实性的一种真实的(尽管仍然未充分探索)替代品。由于这些原因,我得出的结论是,在进一步研究之前,我们应该采取更简约的立场,并说逻辑图只是简单地提供推理信息。
更新日期:2020-10-30
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