We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incomplete information in an evolutionary setup by postulating (i) minimal common knowledge assumptions, (ii) optimally responding agents to conjectural beliefs about how others behave and (iii) evolution of conjectural beliefs with fitness measured by expected payoffs. We axiomatically justify the game forms, derive the evolutionary games for first- and second-price fair division and determine the evolutionarily stable conjectures. The latter coincide with equilibrium bidding, irrespectively of the number of bidders, i.e., heuristic belief adaptation implies the same bidding behavior as equilibrium analysis based on common knowledge and counterfactual bids.

中文翻译：

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公平划分博弈中风险中性投标的间接演化证明

我们通过假设 (i) 最小的常识假设，(ii) 对有关他人行为的推测信念做出最佳响应以及 (iii) 推测信念的演变，来证明在进化设置中具有不完整信息的众所周知的公平划分博弈中的风险中性均衡竞价是合理的用预期收益来衡量适应度。我们公理地证明了博弈形式，推导了一级和二级价格公平划分的进化博弈，并确定了进化稳定的猜想。后者与均衡投标一致，而与投标者的数量无关，即启发式信念适应意味着与基于常识和反事实投标的均衡分析相同的投标行为。