Abstract

Dynamic game-theoretic models of fighting against the corrupt behavior of subjects in the models for coordinating private and public interests are considered. The case of the economic impact of an upper-level subject on a lower-level subjects is investigated. An algorithm for finding equilibria in the case of impulsion is described. Examples of calculations for various sets of input data are presented. A meaningful interpretation of the results is discussed.

中文翻译：

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经济腐败中协调公共和私人利益的动态模型

摘要

考虑了在协调私人和公共利益的模型中与主体的腐败行为作斗争的动态博弈模型。研究了上级科目对下级科目的经济影响的情况。描述了一种在脉冲情况下寻找平衡的算法。给出了各种输入数据集的计算示例。讨论了对结果的有意义的解释。