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Dynamic Models for Coordinating Private and Public Interests in Economic Corruption

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Abstract

Dynamic game-theoretic models of fighting against the corrupt behavior of subjects in the models for coordinating private and public interests are considered. The case of the economic impact of an upper-level subject on a lower-level subjects is investigated. An algorithm for finding equilibria in the case of impulsion is described. Examples of calculations for various sets of input data are presented. A meaningful interpretation of the results is discussed.

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Funding

This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 18-01-00053.

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Correspondence to G. A. Ugol’nitskii or A. B. Usov.

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Translated by O. Pismenov

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Ugol’nitskii, G.A., Usov, A.B. Dynamic Models for Coordinating Private and Public Interests in Economic Corruption. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. Int. 59, 39–48 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230720010128

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230720010128

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