The original design manufacturing (ODM) strategy has become popular in the fashion supply chain field. We consider apparel’s fashion level and advertising effort as important influential factors on goodwill, and present a differential game involving a fashion brand and a supplier. The supplier controls the design improvement effort applied to the apparel and sells it to end consumers through the fashion brand, which controls the advertising effort and retail price. In the case in which the demand for products is affected by goodwill, retail price and promotion, centralised and decentralised differential game models are constructed. The dynamic wholesale price contract is then introduced to solve the external coordination problem. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis of the related parameters is conducted using the numerical simulation method. It is found that the introduction of the dynamic wholesale price contract increases design investment, promotion effort, and goodwill towards and demand for the products. We also derive the feasible region of wholesale prices in which both members are willing to implement the commitment scenario. The win–win region becomes larger as the effectiveness of design innovation increases, whereas it becomes smaller as price sensitivity increases.

原始设计制造（ODM）策略已在时尚供应链领域流行。我们认为服装的时尚水平和广告投入是影响商誉的重要因素，并提出了涉及时尚品牌和供应商的差异游戏。供应商控制应用于服装的设计改进工作，并通过时装品牌​​将其出售给最终消费者，该品牌控制广告工作和零售价格。如果产品的需求受到商誉，零售价格和促销的影响，则构建集中和分散的差分博弈模型。然后引入动态批发价格合同以解决外部协调问题。此外，使用数值模拟方法对相关参数进行敏感性分析。已经发现，动态批发价格合同的引入增加了设计投资，促销努力以及对产品的善意和需求。我们还得出了两个成员都愿意执行承诺方案的批发价格的可行区域。随着设计创新有效性的提高，双赢区域变得更大，而随着价格敏感性的提高，双赢区域变得越来越小。