The necessity of coordination among entities is essential for the success of any supply chain management (SCM). This paper focuses on coordination between two players and cost-sharing in an SCM that considers a vendor and a buyer. For random demand and complex product production, a flexible production system is recommended. The study aims to minimize the total SCM cost under stochastic conditions. In the flexible production systems, the production rate is introduced as the decision variable and the unit production cost is minimum at the obtained optimal value. The setup cost of flexible systems is higher and to control this, a discrete investment function is utilized. The exact information about the probability distribution of lead time demand is not available with known mean and variance. The issue of unknown distribution of lead time demand is solved by considering a distribution-free approach to find the amount of shortages. The game-theoretic approach is employed to obtain closed-form solutions. First, the model is solved under decentralized SCM based on the Stackelberg model, and then solved under centralized SCM. Bargaining is the central theme of any business nowadays among the players of an SCM to make their profit within a centralized and decentralized setup. For this, a cost allocation model for lead time crashing cost based on the Nash bargaining model with the satisfaction level of SCM members is proposed. The cost allocation model under Nash bargaining achieves exciting results in SCM coordination.

中文翻译：

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柔性制造，随机提前期需求和库存混合下的协调供应链管理

实体之间协调的必要性对于任何供应链管理（SCM）的成功至关重要。本文着重于两个参与者之间的协调以及在考虑了卖方和买方的SCM中的成本分摊。对于随机需求和复杂的产品生产，建议使用灵活的生产系统。这项研究旨在使随机条件下的SCM总成本最小化。在柔性生产系统中，将生产率作为决策变量，单位生产成本最小，并获得最佳值。柔性系统的安装成本较高，并且为了控制该成本，需要使用离散的投资功能。无法提供已知均值和方差的提前期需求概率分布的确切信息。提前期需求的未知分配问题可以通过考虑采用无分配方法来找到短缺量来解决。博弈论方法用于获得封闭形式的解决方案。首先，基于Stackelberg模型在分散式SCM下求解该模型，然后在集中式SCM下求解。在SCM的参与者中，讨价还价是当今任何业务的中心主题，要在集中和分散的设置中获利。为此，提出了一种基于纳什议价模型的交货期崩溃成本的成本分配模型，该模型具有供应链管理成员的满意度。纳什讨价还价下的成本分配模型在SCM协调中取得了令人兴奋的结果。博弈论方法用于获得封闭形式的解决方案。首先，基于Stackelberg模型在分散式SCM下求解该模型，然后在集中式SCM下求解。在SCM的参与者中，讨价还价是当今任何业务的中心主题，要在集中和分散的设置中获利。为此，提出了一种基于纳什议价模型的交货期崩溃成本的成本分配模型，该模型具有供应链管理成员的满意度。纳什讨价还价下的成本分配模型在SCM协调中取得了令人兴奋的结果。博弈论方法用于获得封闭形式的解决方案。首先，在基于Stackelberg模型的分散式SCM下求解该模型，然后在集中式SCM下求解。在SCM的参与者中，讨价还价是当今任何业务的中心主题，要在集中和分散的设置中获利。为此，提出了一种基于纳什议价模型的交货期崩溃成本的成本分配模型，该模型具有供应链管理成员的满意度。纳什讨价还价下的成本分配模型在SCM协调中取得了令人兴奋的结果。在SCM的参与者中，讨价还价是当今任何业务的中心主题，要在集中和分散的设置中获利。为此，提出了一种基于纳什议价模型的交货期崩溃成本的成本分配模型，该模型具有供应链管理成员的满意度。纳什讨价还价下的成本分配模型在SCM协调中取得了令人兴奋的结果。讨价还价是当今SCM参与者中任何业务的中心主题，都是通过集中和分散的设置来获利。为此，提出了一种基于纳什议价模型的交货期崩溃成本的成本分配模型，该模型具有供应链管理成员的满意度。纳什讨价还价下的成本分配模型在SCM协调中取得了令人兴奋的结果。