Game-theoretic properties of joint decision making are considered. Procedures based on sequential open voting by veto are investigated. The paper is aimed at the question how to make voters’ behavior intuitively rational when they choose their optimal strategies. The review of the existing results is also presented and the connection between them is established. Further research is discussed as well.

中文翻译：

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顺序否决投票开放程序的性质

考虑联合决策的博弈性质。研究了基于否决权的顺序公开投票程序。本文针对这个问题如何使选民的行为，直观地理性时，他们选择自己的最优策略。还介绍了对现有结果的审查，并建立了它们之间的联系。还讨论了进一步的研究。