Abstract
Game-theoretic properties of joint decision making are considered. Procedures based on sequential open voting by veto are investigated. The paper is aimed at the question how to make voters’ behavior intuitively rational when they choose their optimal strategies. The review of the existing results is also presented and the connection between them is established. Further research is discussed as well.
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Original Russian Text © N.M. Novikova, I.I. Pospelova, 2018, published in Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Seriya 15: Vychislitel’naya Matematika i Kibernetika, 2018, No. 4, pp. 32–40.
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Novikova, N.M., Pospelova, I.I. Properties of Open Procedure of Sequential Veto-Voting. MoscowUniv.Comput.Math.Cybern. 42, 177–185 (2018). https://doi.org/10.3103/S0278641918040064
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3103/S0278641918040064