Philosophical Studies ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2023-06-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-01947-1 Ryan Doody
When you are indifferent between two options, it’s rationally permissible to take either. One way to decide between two such options is to flip a fair coin, taking one option if it lands heads and the other if it lands tails. Is it rationally permissible to employ such a tie-breaking procedure? Intuitively, yes. However, if you are genuinely risk-averse—in particular, if you adhere to risk-weighted expected utility theory (Buchak in Risk and rationality, Oxford University Press, 2013) and have a strictly convex risk-function—the answer will often be no: the REU of deciding by coin-flip will be lower than the REU of choosing one of the options outright (so long as at least one of the options is a nondegenerate gamble). This turns out to be a significant worry for risk-weighted expected utility theory. I argue that it adds real bite to established worries about diachronic consistency afflicting views, like risk-weighted expected utility theory, that violate Independence. And that, while these worries might be surmountable, surmounting them comes at a price.
中文翻译:
冒险和打破平局
当你对两种选择无动于衷时,理性地允许选择任何一种。在两个这样的选项之间做出决定的一种方法是抛一枚公平的硬币,如果正面朝上则选择一个选项,如果反面则选择另一个选项。采用这种打破平局的程序是否合理?直觉上,是的。然而,如果你真的厌恶风险——特别是,如果你坚持风险加权预期效用理论(Buchak in Risk and rationality,牛津大学出版社,2013 年)并且具有严格的凸风险函数——答案通常是否:通过掷硬币决定的 REU 将低于直接选择其中一个选项的 REU(只要至少一个选项是非退化赌博)。事实证明,这是风险加权预期效用理论的一个重大担忧。我认为,它确实增加了对历时一致性影响观点的既定担忧,比如风险加权预期效用理论,这些观点违反了独立性。而且,虽然这些担忧可能是可以克服的,但克服它们是有代价的。