当前位置: X-MOL 学术Psychol. Inq. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered
Psychological Inquiry ( IF 7.2 ) Pub Date : 2018-10-10 , DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2018.1480619
Arie W. Kruglanski 1 , Katarzyna Jasko 2 , Maxim Milyavsky 1 , Marina Chernikova 1 , David Webber 3 , Antonio Pierro 4 , Daniela di Santo 4
Affiliation  

From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency, whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy is systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.

中文翻译:

社会心理学中的认知一致性理论:一种范式的重新思考

从1950年代开始,心理学家普遍认为人们普遍具有认知一致性的需求,这种矛盾导致的挫败感会带来负面影响。通过介绍认知动机之间的区别,我们提供了有关此问题的新颖观点一致和不一致的认知的影响。认知方面以这种认知所解决的结果的更新期望值来表示。动机方面源于该结果的价值(可取性)。我们表明,结果的价值或其更新的预期均未与认知一致性或前后矛盾系统相关。因此,我们质疑一致性在推动情感反应以及相关的普遍性人类对认知一致性的需求的推定中的作用。
更新日期:2018-10-11
down
wechat
bug