To protect end-consumers from the financial impact of renewable energy subsidies, it is common for governments to radically change the level of support initially promised to investors. In reaction, investors can sue states before international arbitration tribunals. Based on a detailed analysis of recent (2017–2018) arbitration decisions in the renewable energy sector, this article identifies criteria of regulatory stability that states have to respect when reforming support schemes. The “regulatory stability model” developed in this article is then applied to the specific case of Kazakhstan – a country characterized with high regulatory risk and policy instability. The analysis highlights how a country with a risky investment environment can make stability commitments to mitigate investors’ concern of regulatory change. Paradoxically, too much regulatory stability can prevent the government from controlling the volume of subsidized renewable energy, which in turn can trigger radical policy change. This article concludes that, to limit regulatory risk for investors, it is insufficient to focus only on the protection of existing projects against regulatory change. A certain degree of regulatory flexibility must be integrated in support schemes to help governments limit the number of renewable energy projects eligible for support, and so limit the impact of subsidies on consumers.

为了保护最终消费者免受可再生能源补贴的财务影响，政府通常会从根本上改变最初向投资者承诺的支持水平。作为回应，投资者可以向国际仲裁法庭提起诉讼。基于对可再生能源行业最近（2017-2018年）仲裁裁决的详细分析，本文确定了监管支持标准改革时各国必须遵守的监管稳定性标准。然后，将本文开发的“监管稳定性模型”应用于哈萨克斯坦的特定案例-哈萨克斯坦是一个监管风险高且政策不稳定的国家。分析强调了一个具有高风险投资环境的国家如何做出稳定承诺，以减轻投资者对监管变化的担忧。矛盾的是，过多的监管稳定性会阻止政府控制补贴的可再生能源的数量，进而引发根本性的政策变化。本文得出的结论是，为了限制投资者的监管风险，仅关注于保护现有项目不受监管变更是不够的。支持计划必须纳入一定程度的监管灵活性，以帮助政府限制有资格获得支持的可再生能源项目的数量，从而限制补贴对消费者的影响。仅将重点放在保护现有项目免受法规变更方面是不够的。支持计划必须纳入一定程度的监管灵活性，以帮助政府限制有资格获得支持的可再生能源项目的数量，从而限制补贴对消费者的影响。仅将重点放在保护现有项目免受法规变更方面是不够的。支持计划必须纳入一定程度的监管灵活性，以帮助政府限制有资格获得支持的可再生能源项目的数量，从而限制补贴对消费者的影响。