Consciousness remains a formidable challenge. Different theories of consciousness have proposed vastly different mechanisms to account for phenomenal experience. Here, appealing to aspects of global workspace theory, higher-order theories, social theories, and predictive processing, we introduce a novel framework: the self-organizing metarerpresentational account (SOMA), in which consciousness is viewed as something that the brain learns to do. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of metarepresentations that qualify target first-order representations. Thus, experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. In this sense, consciousness is the brain's (unconscious, embodied, enactive, nonconceptual) theory about itself.

中文翻译：

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学会有意识

意识仍然是一项艰巨的挑战。不同的意识理论提出了截然不同的机制来解释现象经验。在这里，借鉴全局工作空间理论、高阶理论、社会理论和预测处理的各个方面，我们引入了一个新颖的框架：自组织元表征账户（SOMA），其中意识被视为大脑学会的东西做。通过这种解释，大脑不断地、无意识地学会向自己重新描述自己的活动，从而开发出符合目标一阶表征的元表征系统。因此，经验只发生在那些已经学会知道他们拥有某些一阶状态并且已经学会更关心某些状态而不是其他状态的体验者身上。在这个意义上，