Climate change will have dangerous impacts on future generations. Accordingly, people in the present have an obligation to make sacrifices for the benefit of future others. However, research on temporal and social discounting shows that people are short-sighted and selfish—they prefer immediate over delayed benefits, and they prefer benefits for themselves over others. Discounting over long-term time horizons is known as intergenerational discounting, and is a major obstacle to climate action. Here, we examine whether persuasive messages that activate the legacy motive—the desire to build a positive legacy—can increase the willingness of current actors to make sacrifices for future generations. Using a climate change public goods game, we find that when the benefits of cooperation accrue to decision makers in the present, high levels of cooperation are sustained, whereas when the benefits accrue to future generations, intergenerational discounting makes cooperation elusive. Crucially, when the legacy motive is activated—by promoting death awareness, feelings of power asymmetry, and intergenerational reciprocity—intergenerational discounting is attenuated, and cooperation is restored. Our results suggest climate action can be fostered by framing climate change as an intergenerational dilemma, and by crafting persuasive messages that activate people’s drive to leave a positive legacy.

气候变化将对子孙后代产生危险影响。因此，目前的人们有义务为将来的他人的利益做出牺牲。但是，有关时间和社会折价的研究表明，人们是短视的和自私的-他们更喜欢立即获得的利益而不是延迟获得的利益，并且他们更喜欢为自己带来的利益。长期来看，折现被称为代际折现，它是气候行动的主要障碍。在这里，我们研究了具有说服力的信息是否能够激发传统动机，即建立积极遗产的愿望，是否可以提高当前行为者为子孙后代做出牺牲的意愿。通过气候变化公益游戏，我们发现当合作决策的收益在当前的决策者中产生时，保持了高水平的合作，而当利益累积到子孙后代时，代际折扣使合作变得难以捉摸。至关重要的是，当传统动机被激活时（通过提高死亡意识，权力不对称感和代际互惠感），代际折扣减少了，合作得以恢复。我们的研究结果表明，可以通过将气候变化归结为代际困境，并通过制造有说服力的信息来激发人们留下积极遗产的意愿，来促进气候行动。代际互惠—代际折扣减少，合作得以恢复。我们的结果表明，可以通过将气候变化归结为代际困境，并通过制造有说服力的信息来激发人们留下积极的遗产的精神，来促进气候行动。代际互惠—代际折扣减少，合作得以恢复。我们的研究结果表明，可以通过将气候变化归结为代际困境，并通过制造有说服力的信息来激发人们留下积极遗产的意愿，来促进气候行动。