Savage's rational axiom of decision making under uncertainty, called the 'Sure Thing' principle, was purportedly falsified in a two-stage gamble paradigm by Tversky and Shafir (1992). This work revealed that participants would take a second-stage gamble for both possible outcomes of the initial-stage gamble, but would significantly depress this choice when no information was available on the outcome of the initial-stage gamble. Subsequent research has reported difficulty to replicate this Disjunction Effect in the two-stage gamble paradigm. We repeated this simulated two-stage gamble paradigm in an online study (N = 1119) but adapted the range of payoff amounts, and controlled the order of the blocks of two-stage gambles with, respectively without, information on the outcome of the first-stage gamble. The main empirical contributions of this study are that more risk averse participants produced (i) a reliable order effect in relation to the Disjunction Effect and the violation of the Law of Total Probability, and (ii) a novel inflation effect on gambling in the Unknown outcome condition analogous but opposite to the Disjunction Effect when Unknown outcome conditioned two-stage gambles precede the Known outcome conditioned ones. By contrast, we found that less risk averse participants produced neither of these effects. We discuss the underlying choice processes and compare the effectiveness of a logistic model, a Markov model and a quantum-like model. Our main theoretical findings are (i) a standard utility model and a Markov model using heuristic linear utility, contextual influence and carry-over effect cannot accommodate the present empirical results, and (ii) a model based on quantum dynamics, matched in form to the Markov model, can successfully describe all major aspects of our data.

中文翻译：

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两阶段模拟赌博中的分离效应。启发式逻辑、马尔可夫和类量子模型的实验研究与比较

萨维奇关于不确定性下决策的理性公理，称为“确定的事情”原则，据称在 Tversky 和 ​​Shafir (1992) 的两阶段赌博范式中被证伪。这项工作表明，参与者会为初始阶段赌博的两种可能结果进行第二阶段赌博，但当没有关于初始阶段赌博结果的信息时，会显着抑制这种选择。随后的研究报告称，很难在两阶段赌博范式中复制这种分离效应。我们在在线研究 (N = 1119) 中重复了这种模拟的两阶段赌博范式，但调整了回报金额的范围，并分别控制了两阶段赌博块的顺序，分别没有关于第一阶段结果的信息-阶段赌博。本研究的主要实证贡献是，更多的风险规避参与者产生了 (i) 与分离效应和违反总概率定律相关的可靠秩序效应，以及 (ii) 在未知情况下对赌博的新通胀效应结果条件类似于但与分离效应相反，当未知结果条件两阶段赌博先于已知结果条件赌博时。相比之下，我们发现风险规避程度较低的参与者不会产生这些影响。我们讨论了潜在的选择过程，并比较了逻辑模型、马尔可夫模型和类量子模型的有效性。我们的主要理论发现是 (i) 标准效用模型和使用启发式线性效用的马尔可夫模型，