Four variants on Tulving's "Remember/Know" paradigm supported a tripartite classification of recollective experience in recognition memory into Remembering (as in conscious recollection of a past episode), Knowing (similar to retrieval from semantic memory), and Feeling (a priming-based judgment of familiarity). Recognition-by-knowing and recognition-by-feeling are differentiated by level of processing at the time of encoding (Experiments 1-3), shifts in the criterion for item recognition (Experiment 2), response latencies (Experiments 1-3), and changes in the response window (Experiment 3). False recognition is often accompanied by "feeling", but rarely by "knowing"; d' is higher for knowing than for feeling (Experiments 1-4). Recognition-by-knowing increases with additional study trials, while recognition-by-feeling falls to zero (Experiment 4). In these ways, recognition-by-knowing is distinguished from recognition-by-feeling in much the same way as, in the traditional Remember/Know paradigm, recognition-by-remembering can be distinguished from recognition-without-remembering. Implications are discussed for dual-process theories of memory, and the search for the neural substrates of memory retrieval.

中文翻译：

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各种回忆经历。


图尔文的“记住/知道”范式的四个变体支持将识别记忆中的回忆体验分为“记忆”（如对过去情节的有意识回忆）、“知道”（类似于从语义记忆中检索）和“感觉”（基于启动的熟悉程度判断）。认知识别和感觉识别的区别在于编码时的处理级别（实验 1-3）、项目识别标准的变化（实验 2）、响应延迟（实验 1-3）、以及响应窗口的变化（实验 3）。错误认识常常伴随着“感觉”，但很少伴随着“知道”；知道的 d' 高于感觉的 d'（实验 1-4）。随着额外的研究试验，认知认知会增加，而感觉认知会下降到零（实验 4）。通过这些方式，“知道识别”与“感觉识别”的区别与传统“记住/知道”范式中“记住识别”与“无记忆识别”的区别非常相似。讨论了记忆双过程理论的含义，以及寻找记忆检索的神经基础。