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Predicate encryption against master-key tampering attacks
Cybersecurity ( IF 3.9 ) Pub Date : 2019-08-27 , DOI: 10.1186/s42400-019-0039-6
Yuejun Liu , Rui Zhang , Yongbin Zhou

Many real world attacks often target the implementation of a cryptographic scheme, rather than the algorithm itself, and a system designer has to consider new models that can capture these attacks. For example, if the key can be tampered by physical attacks on the device, the security of the scheme becomes totally unclear. In this work, we investigate predicate encryption (PE), a powerful encryption primitive, in the setting of tampering attacks. First, we show that many existing frameworks to construct PE are vulnerable to tampering attacks. Then we present a new security notion to capture such attacks. Finally, we take Attrapadung’s framework in Eurocrypt’14 as an example to show how to “compile" these frameworks to tampering resilient ones. Moreover, our method is compatible with the original pair encoding schemes without introducing any redundancy.

中文翻译:

针对主密钥篡改攻击的谓词加密

许多现实世界的攻击通常针对加密方案的实现,而不是算法本身,系统设计人员必须考虑可以捕获这些攻击的新模型。例如,如果设备上的物理攻击可以篡改密钥,则该方案的安全性就变得完全不清楚。在这项工作中,我们研究了在篡改攻击设置中的谓词加密 (PE),这是一种强大的加密原语。首先,我们表明许多现有的构建 PE 的框架容易受到篡改攻击。然后我们提出了一个新的安全概念来捕获此类攻击。最后,我们以 Eurocrypt'14 中 Attrapadung 的框架为例,展示如何“编译”这些框架以篡改弹性框架。此外,
更新日期:2019-08-27
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