In many liberalized electricity markets, power generators can receive payments for maintaining capacity through capacity markets. These payments help stabilize generator revenues, making investment in capacity more attractive for risk-averse investors when other outlets for risk trading are limited. Here we develop a heuristic algorithm to solve large-scale stochastic equilibrium models describing a competitive market with incomplete risk trading. Introduction of a capacity mechanism has an asymmetric effect on the risk profile of different generation technologies, tilting the resource mix towards those with lower fixed costs and higher operating costs. One implication of this result is that current market structures may be ill-suited to financing low-carbon resources, the most scalable of which have high fixed costs and near-zero operating costs. Development of new risk trading mechanisms to replace or complement current capacity obligations could lead to more efficient outcomes.

在许多自由化的电力市场中，发电机可以通过容量市场收取维持容量的费用。这些付款有助于稳定发电商的收入，在其他风险交易渠道有限的情况下，使对容量规避的投资者的容量投资更具吸引力。在这里，我们开发了一种启发式算法来解决描述具有不完全风险交易的竞争市场的大规模随机均衡模型。引入容量机制对不同发电技术的风险状况具有非对称影响，使资源组合向固定成本较低和运营成本较高的企业倾斜。这种结果的一个暗示是，当前的市场结构可能不适合为低碳资源筹集资金，而这些资源的最大可扩展性具有较高的固定成本和接近零的运营成本。