Over the past two decades, “illegal” natural resource extraction has become a significant driver of environmental change and social conflict across the Global South. In response, numerous Sub-Saharan African states have engaged in governance reforms that heed calls to securitize – or, establish and consolidate state control over – natural resources. In Ghana, securitization has served to entrench the informal economy as domestic producers, marginalized in the process of reform, continue to utilize non-state institutions to maintain access. While the Ghanaian state has branded “illegal” resource extraction a major environmental, social, and national security concern, it has responded to this threat unevenly; it has violently enforced its authority in some contexts but remained relatively indifferent in others. This article explores the phenomenon of selective enforcement to explain patterns of violence that have emerged between state and society in response to both securitization and informality. Drawing on a multimethod approach, I find that natural resource governance authority remains fragmented across resource contexts, and that the configuration of authority and interests on the ground shapes the extent of state intervention. I propose a natural resource typology that identifies when the state is most likely to enforce its authority, and the degree of violent conflict likely to result. Ultimately, I contend that domestic patterns of enforcement are shaped primarily by: 1) competition with local power holders over resource entitlements and 2) global conservation and extraction priorities. While specific to Ghana, this argument can provide important insights into the relationship between informal extraction, state enforcement, and social conflict in other Global South contexts.

在过去的二十年中，“非法”自然资源的开采已成为整个南方地区环境变化和社会冲突的重要驱动力。作为回应，许多撒哈拉以南非洲国家参与了治理改革，听取了对自然资源进行证券化（或建立和巩固国家对自然资源的控制）的呼吁。在加纳，证券化已经巩固了非正规经济，因为在改革过程中被边缘化的国内生产者继续利用非国家机构来维持准入。加纳国家将“非法”资源开采标记为环境，社会和国家安全的主要问题，但它对这种威胁的反应不均衡。它在某些情况下猛烈地行使了权力，但在其他情况下却相对漠不关心。本文探讨选择性执法的现象，以解释在国家和社会之间针对证券化和非正式行为而出现的暴力模式。借助多方法方法，我发现自然资源治理权限在资源上下文中仍然是零散的，并且权限和利益的实际配置决定了国家干预的程度。我提出了一种自然资源类型学，可以识别何时最有可能执行国家的权力，以及可能导致的暴力冲突的程度。最终，我认为，国内的执法模式主要是由以下因素决定的：1）与当地权力持有者在资源权利上的竞争； 2）全球保护和采伐优先事项。虽然特定于加纳，