Is self-serving lying intuitive? Or does honesty come naturally? Many experiments have manipulated reliance on intuition in behavioral-dishonesty tasks, with mixed results. We present two meta-analyses (with evidential value) testing whether an intuitive mind-set affects the proportion of liars (k = 73; n = 12,711) and the magnitude of lying (k = 50; n = 6,473). The results indicate that when dishonesty harms abstract others, promoting intuition causes more people to lie, log odds ratio = 0.38, p = .0004, and people to lie more, Hedges's g = 0.26, p < .0001. However, when dishonesty inflicts harm on concrete others, promoting intuition has no significant effect on dishonesty (p > .63). We propose one potential explanation: The intuitive appeal of prosociality may cancel out the intuitive selfish appeal of dishonesty, suggesting that the social consequences of lying could be a promising key to the riddle of intuition's role in honesty. We discuss limitations such as the relatively unbalanced distribution of studies using concrete versus abstract victims and the overall large interstudy heterogeneity.

中文翻译：

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直觉诚实与不诚实：荟萃分析证据。

自私的说谎是直觉的吗？还是诚实自然而然？许多实验在行为不当任务中操纵了对直觉的依赖，结果不一。我们提供了两个荟萃分析（具有证据价值），测试直觉思维方式是否会影响说谎者的比例（k = 73； n = 12,711）和说谎的程度（k = 50； n = 6,473）。结果表明，当不诚实行为伤害抽象他人时，促进直觉会导致更多人撒谎，对数比= 0.38，p = .0004，而人们撒谎，Hedges's g = 0.26，p <.0001。但是，当不诚实行为对其他人造成伤害时，促进直觉对不诚实行为没有显着影响（p> .63）。我们提出一种可能的解释：亲社会的直觉诉求可能会抵消不诚实的直觉自私诉求，这表明说谎的社会后果可能是直觉在诚实中的作用之谜的有希望的关键。我们讨论了局限性，例如使用具体受害者与抽象受害者的研究分布相对不平衡，以及总体研究间的异质性。