So far, 21 countries have introduced—and some thereafter withdrawn—reserved legislative seats for their citizens living abroad. Existing literature on this form of special representation has studied this topic either empirically or normatively. We bring these two approaches together based on the main dimensions of institutional variation of special representation: (1) eligibility, (2) constituency structure and (3) electoral proportionality. We first discuss each dimension from a normative perspective. In the second step, we map the range of empirical variation and highlight the most common arrangements. We conclude that the normative justification for special representation is generally weak, but some institutional configurations pose fewer problems. Specifically, we see fewer issues with special representation when electoral inclusion is limited to the first generation of emigrants and when it is used to limit the electoral influence of non‐resident populations that make up a large share of the overall electorate. By grounding our normative discussion on an empirical mapping, we bridge two disconnected literatures on special representation of non‐resident citizens.

中文翻译：

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评估非居民公民的特殊代表权：资格、选区和比例

到目前为止，已有 21 个国家为居住在海外的公民设立了保留立法席位，有些国家后来又取消了这一席位。关于这种特殊代表形式的现有文献已经从经验上研究了这个主题或者规范地。我们根据特殊代表性的制度变异的主要维度将这两种方法结合在一起：（1）资格，（2）选区结构和（3）选举比例。我们首先从规范的角度讨论每个维度。在第二步中，我们绘制了经验变异的范围并突出显示了最常见的安排。我们的结论是，特殊代表性的规范性理由普遍较弱，但某些制度配置造成的问题较少。具体来说，当选举包容性仅限于第一代移民时，以及当它被用来限制占总体选民很大一部分的非居民人口的选举影响力时，我们看到的特殊代表性问题较少。通过将我们的规范性讨论建立在实证映射的基础上，我们弥合了关于非居民公民特殊代表性的两篇互不相关的文献。