This paper investigates portfolio pumping at the fund family level, where non-star fund managers strategically purchase stocks held by star funds in the family to inflate their quarter-end performance. Star funds that engage in such activities show inflated performance after 2002 when the Securities and Exchange Commission increased regulation on portfolio pumping. Stocks pumped by the strategy show strong reversals at the quarter end. Moreover, despite a minor underperformance stemming from portfolio misallocation, non-star fund managers pumping for star funds receive abnormally high subsequent flows, suggesting a pattern of family subsidization.

中文翻译：

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共同基金家族的投资组合注入

本文研究了基金家族层面的投资组合抽水行为，即非明星基金经理战略性地购买家族中明星基金持有的股票，以夸大其季度末业绩。 2002 年美国证券交易委员会加强了对投资组合抽水的监管后，参与此类活动的明星基金表现出夸大的业绩。受该策略推动的股票在季度末出现强劲逆转。此外，尽管投资组合错配导致业绩略有下滑，但为明星基金注入资金的非明星基金经理却获得了异常高的后续资金流，这表明存在家庭补贴模式。