In a recent series of important papers, Søren Overgaard has defended a disjunctivist reading of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perception. According to Overgaard, Husserl commits to disjunctivism when arguing that hallucination intrinsically differs from perception because only experiences of the latter kind carry singular content and, thereby, pick out individuals. This paper rejects that interpretation by invoking the theory of intentionality developed by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. It is claimed that this theory not only lacks the notion of singular content, but it also entails the idea that perceptions and hallucinations belong to the same kind of experience. If that is correct, a commitment to conjuctivism on Husserl’s end follows, pace Overgaard.

在最近的一系列重要论文中，索伦·奥弗加德（Søren Overgaard）捍卫了对埃德蒙·胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl）知觉理论的析取主义解读。根据奥弗加德的说法，胡塞尔在主张幻觉本质上不同于知觉时致力于析取主义，因为只有后者的经验才带有单一的内容，从而挑选出个体。本文通过引用胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中发展的意向性理论来拒绝这种解释。据称，这一理论不仅缺乏单一内容的概念，而且还隐含着知觉和幻觉属于同一类体验的观点。如果这是正确的，那么胡塞尔最终就会对联结论做出承诺，奥弗加德步调一致。