Some ecofeminist scholars have argued that being a feminist entails being a contextual vegan. Donna Haraway has opposed this position and received extensive critique. Yet no one, to my knowledge, has systematically studied how Haraway's theory can enrich ecofeminist vegan literature. To this end, I first establish the method of analysis, and/or framework, I use to read Haraway's work, what I call, interconstitutionality. Next, I delineate the limitations of Haraway's thinking insofar as it assumes a position of human dominion over animals. I then explore some aspects of Haraway's theory that can enrich ecofeminist vegan scholarship and provide insights to go beyond the limits of Haraway's corpus regarding: (1) the entanglements and embodied vulnerabilities that constitute human and non-human animals; (2) the agency of animals and the importance of curiosity and respect in leading just lives with other than human animals; (3) the ethical relevance of otherness, difference, and vulnerability at multiple scales: subject, community/herd, species, and cross-species (e.g., there are shared vulnerabilities between beings who are pregnant regardless of the species they belong to); and (4) the unavoidable violence that human existence entails. The text closes by affirming an ecofeminist non-anthropocentric vegan ontology and ethico-politics that aspires to overcome human dominion over animals.

一些生态女性主义学者认为，成为一名女权主义者就意味着成为一名情境素食主义者。唐娜·哈拉维反对这一立场并受到广泛批评。然而，据我所知，没有人系统地研究哈拉维的理论如何丰富生态女性主义纯素文献。为此，我首先建立分析方法和/或框架，我用它来阅读哈拉维的著作，我称之为“互宪性”。接下来，我将描述哈拉维思想的局限性，因为它假定了人类对动物的统治地位。然后，我探讨了哈拉维理论的一些方面，这些方面可以丰富生态女性主义纯素食学术，并提供超越哈拉维语料库限制的见解：（1）构成人类和非人类动物的纠缠和体现的脆弱性； (2) 动物的作用以及好奇心和尊重在与人类以外的动物过正义生活时的重要性； (3) 差异性、差异性和脆弱性在多个尺度上的伦理相关性：主体、社区/群体、物种和跨物种（例如，无论属于哪个物种，怀孕的生物之间都存在共同的脆弱性）； (4)人类生存不可避免的暴力。文本最后肯定了一种生态女性主义的非人类中心的纯素食本体论和伦理政治，渴望克服人类对动物的统治。