Motivated by recent practice observations, we consider an incumbent manufacturer who has an existing wholesale contract with an e-commerce platform, which the latter sells as a private label product in its online marketplace. In this context, the manufacturer launches its follower product, which will coexist alongside the private label product on the platform. We study the interplay between the manufacturer’s choice of selling format (i.e., reselling or agency) and how this choice influences the platform’s decision to share (or not to share) demand information with the manufacturer (i.e., information sharing policy). In particular, we examine how the platform’s information-sharing policy, depending on its perceived information accuracy, impacts the manufacturer’s selling format decision. Using game-theoretic analyses, we find that under low perceived information accuracy, the manufacturer adopts the agency format when the commission rate is low but the reselling format when the commission rate is high. However, the platform withholds the demand information. More interestingly, when the commission rate and perceived information accuracy are both high, the manufacturer switches from the reselling to the agency format and this induces the platform to share demand information. This benefits both the manufacturer and the platform with the zone expanding when perceived information accuracy is at least moderate but shrinking when the market size potential of the follower product increases. Ultimately, both parties can benefit from information sharing once in business and when the commission rate is high. The platform should also invest in greater information accuracy in such conditions.

中文翻译：

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平台信息共享对厂商蚕食和销售业态决策的影响

受最近实践观察的启发，我们考虑一家现有制造商与电子商务平台签订了现有批发合同，后者在其在线市场上作为自有品牌产品进行销售。在此背景下，制造商推出了其追随产品，该产品将与平台上的自有品牌产品共存。我们研究制造商选择的销售形式（即转售或代理）之间的相互作用以及这种选择如何影响平台与制造商共享（或不共享）需求信息的决定（即信息共享政策）。特别是，我们研究了平台的信息共享政策（取决于其感知的信息准确性）如何影响制造商的销售格式决策。通过博弈论分析，我们发现，在感知信息准确性较低的情况下，制造商在佣金率低时采用代理模式，而在佣金率高时则采用转售模式。但该平台隐瞒了需求信息。更有趣的是，当佣金率和感知信息准确度都很高时，制造商从转售转向代理模式，这促使平台共享需求信息。这对制造商和平台都有好处，当感知的信息准确性至少适中时，区域会扩大，但当追随产品的市场规模潜力增加时，区域会缩小。最终，一旦开展业务且佣金率较高，双方都可以从信息共享中受益。在这种情况下，平台还应该投资提高信息准确性。