The nature of most-favoured-nation clauses (MFN clauses) is a constant source of debate and controversy. While the traditional position has been that they allow an investor to import provisions from another International Investment Agreement (IIA)—a practice that has been defined by some as ‘importation’1—there is a new trend that considers this a misuse of MFN clauses. This article endorses the latter position and will explain that the practice of importation derives from a misinterpretation of MFN clauses contained in IIAs. This error involves requesting a remedy for the specific performance of the MFN clause without first having claimed its breach. The claimant asks an arbitral tribunal simply to enforce the MFN clause by granting him the same provisions conferred to another investor. However, in this exercise, the investor forgets that, in order for an arbitral tribunal to order such a remedy, it must first be proven that such an obligation exists and was breached by the host state.

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最惠国条款在投资仲裁中的运用：进口问题

最惠国条款（MFN 条款）的性质一直是争论和争议的根源。虽然传统立场是允许投资者进口另一项国际投资协定 (IIA) 中的条款（这种做法被一些人定义为“进口”1），但有一种新趋势认为这是对最惠国条款的滥用。本文赞同后一种立场，并将解释进口做法源于对国际投资协定中最惠国条款的误解。该错误涉及在未首先声称违反最惠国条款的情况下请求对最惠国条款的具体履行进行补救。申请人请求仲裁庭仅通过给予他与另一投资者相同的条款来执行最惠国条款。然而，在这种做法中，投资者忘记了，为了让仲裁庭下令采取这种补救措施，必须首先证明东道国存在这种义务并且违反了这种义务。