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Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Pub Date : 2024-03-27 , DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13054
Anthony Bigg 1 , Andrew J. Latham 2 , Kristie Miller 3 , Shira Yechimovitz 1, 4
Affiliation  

We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems to them as though time robustly passes and to judge that time does robustly pass. According to the former, a greater degree of vividness will tend to increase the extent to which people make such reports, while according to the latter, it will tend to decrease the extent to which people make such reports. We found weak evidence in favour of the former hypothesis. We reflect on the implications of this finding for theorising about such reports.

中文翻译:

情景想象、时间经验和时间信念

我们探讨了情景想象的作用,解释了为什么人们都不同地报告说,在他们的经验中,时间似乎在稳健地流逝,以及为什么他们不同地报告说,他们相信时间实际上确实在稳健地流逝。我们实证研究了两个假设:差异生动性假设和心理时间旅行假设。根据这些观点,人们生动地情景想象过去/未来事态的程度会影响他们报告“在他们看来时间在稳健地流逝”以及判断时间确实在稳健地流逝的倾向。根据前者,更大程度的生动性往往会增加人们做出此类报告的程度,而根据后者,它往往会减少人们做出此类报告的程度。我们发现支持前一种假设的证据微弱。我们反思这一发现对此类报告理论化的影响。
更新日期:2024-03-27
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