In this article I argue that we should understand some forms of hypocritical behaviour in terms of epistemic injustice; a type of injustice in which a person is wronged in their capacity as a knower. If each of us has an interest in knowing what morality requires of us, this can be undermined when hypocritical behaviour distorts our perception of the moral landscape by misrepresenting the demandingness of putative moral obligations. This suggests that a complete theory of the wrongness of hypocrisy must account for hypocrisy as epistemic injustice.

中文翻译：

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虚伪与认知不公

在这篇文章中，我认为我们应该从认知不公正的角度来理解某些形式的虚伪行为；一种不公正的行为，其中一个人作为认识者的身份受到了不公正的对待。如果我们每个人都有兴趣了解道德对我们的要求，那么当虚伪行为通过歪曲假定的道德义务的要求而扭曲我们对道德景观的看法时，这种兴趣就会受到损害。这表明，关于伪善错误的完整理论必须将伪善解释为认识上的不公正。