Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Pub Date : 2024-03-11 , DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13052 Peter J. Graham 1
1 THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM
I shall use ‘epistemic warrant’ and ‘epistemic justification’ interchangeably for a normative property that provides a good route to true belief and knowledge.1
- FACT ONE: Beliefs based on taking perceptual experiences at face value are defeasibly epistemically warranted.
- FACT TWO: Defeasibly taking perceptual experience at face value is a reliable route to true belief.
Epistemologists disagree over their relationship.
In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima facie epistemically warranted in W if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological processes that caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in W.
So-called “internalists” disagree. They deny that being a reliable route to truth is necessary for warrant, relying on the “New Evil Demon” scenario to make their case.3 Here's the standard version:4
Norma is an ordinary human adult, with normally functioning perceptual and cognitive capacities, in her normal environment. Walking around the park, she forms reliably true perceptual beliefs about her environment. Perception, in her world, is a reliable route to truth and knowledge.
Vicki is Norma's psychological duplicate in another possible world. From the inside, as it were, everything looks exactly to Vicki as it does to Norma. But Vicki is not walking around a park. Instead, she is floating in a vat of nutrients, where her sensory systems are hooked up to a massive super-computer. The computer deceives Vicki by inducing type identical perceptual representations to Norma's. That's why everything (in perception) looks the same to Vicki as it does to Norma, but nothing in Vicki's immediate surrounds is as it seems. Vicki, unaware of and unable to detect the deception, forms massively false perceptual beliefs. Perception, in her world, is not a reliable route to truth and knowledge.
Internalists conclude that Vicki's perceptual beliefs, though massively in error, are nonetheless just as justified— “equally justified”—as Norma's. Taking perceptual experience at face value, given no reason to suppose it is not a good guide to truth in the circumstances, is just what Vicki is supposed to do. That's the correct or proper response to her perceptual experiences. If Vicki's perceptual states justify her perceptual beliefs, simple reliabilism doesn't stand a chance. That's why it's called the New Evil Demon Problem.
[R]eliability has nothing to do with epistemic justification… [B]eliefs are justified because the believer is “reasoning correctly” (in a broad sense of “reasoning” [where perceptual experience are reasons in an extended sense and so perceptual belief formation is a kind of reasoning]). If one makes all the right epistemic moves, then one is justified regardless of whether the belief is false, or nature conspires to make such reasoning unreliable. (Pollock and Cruz, 1999: 113–114).
If justification strongly supervenes on an individual's (nonfactive) mental states and relations, as the internalist supposes, but the reliability of perceptual beliefs is a contingent matter of fact, then justification as such has nothing to do with reliability or truth. Since our first fact is necessarily true, says the internalist, the second fact is irrelevant to epistemic justification. That's the moral, according to the internalist, of the New Evil Demon Problem. No wonder so many internalists so easily dismiss reliabilism with a one-liner.
We owe the New Evil Demon Problem to Stewart Cohen. Cohen discovered the problem while a graduate student at the University of Arizona, at one time the center of the epistemological universe. Cohen first published the problem in a paper co-authored with Keith Lehrer in 1983 (Lehrer and Cohen, 1983) and then developed it further in his landmark paper “Justification and Truth” (Cohen, 1984; cf. Pollock, 1984; Foley, 1987). The New Evil Demon Problem is now over forty years old.
Reliabilists remain undeterred. Here are two ways reliabilists have responded.
I call the first, following Ernest Sosa (2003), the “heroic” response. According to the heroic response, internalists are just mistaken that Vicki has justified beliefs. This response starts with the force, role, or job of epistemic warrant: to be a good route to truth and knowledge. That's what makes epistemic justification epistemic. Justification as such then strongly supervenes on the reliability of the belief-forming process. But since perception is only contingently reliable (as the demon world case vividly illustrates), perceptual justification does not strongly supervene on an individual's (non-factive) mental states and their relations. Internalists, the idea goes, simply misunderstand the role or force of epistemic justification. Vicki's perceptual beliefs are then obviously not justified, for they don't stand a chance of being true. Philosophers taking this line include Sanford Goldberg (2012a),5 Thomas Senor (2013), and Jack Lyons (2013).6 I shall call these three philosophers, and their like-minded colleagues, “our heroes.”
Our heroes, though they deny that Vicki's beliefs are epistemically justified, usually grant that she is being rational in so believing, that her perceptual beliefs are rationally held (Meyers, 1988; Lyons, 2013). That, they think, often explains the internalist's “intuition” that Vicki's perceptual beliefs are just as “justified” as Norma's, for so many internalists tend to use ‘justification’ and ‘rationality’ interchangeably (e.g. Cohen, 1984: 283; Foley, 1987; Huemer, 2001: 19; Smithies, 2012: 274; Wedgwood, 2012: 280; Dogramaci, 2015: 777; cf. Siscoe, 2021; Sylvan, ms.). But once we separate epistemic justification (in the sense of a good route to truth and knowledge) from structural rationality, we should not be so quick to judge that Vicki's beliefs are epistemically justified.7
That's the first response. I call the second the “special-circumstances” response. According to this response, Vicki's beliefs are epistemically justified, even though her perceptual representations are not de facto—“in situ”—reliable. They are epistemically justified because her perceptual representations (her perceptual belief-forming processes) are reliable in a special set of circumstances. It's because they are reliable in special circumstances, the idea goes, that they continue to contribute to the epistemic warrant for perceptual beliefs even when the individual is not in special circumstances. Because Vicki's perceptual belief-forming processes are reliable in special circumstances, the idea goes, they produce epistemically justified beliefs even while Vicki is floating motionless and massively deceived in a vat of nutrients.
I shall spend most of the paper on this response. For this response to work, it must at least specify “correct” necessary and sufficient conditions for epistemic justification. But it must also specify conditions that are appropriately deep or revelatory. In other words, this response must not only correctly predict that Vicki's perceptual beliefs are justified, but it must also explain why that should be so.
Three of the most influential philosophers of the last fifty-years—Alvin Goldman, Ernest Sosa, and Tyler Burge—have all pursued versions of the special-circumstances response. It's the party line. In the first half of the paper, I will criticize their respective versions of this response. In the second half I will develop my own. The point of the second part is to develop the most plausible reliabilist account of warranted beliefs in demon world scenarios. I shall return to our heroes when concluding.
中文翻译：
40岁新邪魔问题
1 新的邪恶恶魔问题
我将交替使用“认知依据”和“认知理由”来表示规范属性，它为真正的信念和知识提供了良好的途径。1
- 事实一：基于表面上的感知体验的信念在认识论上是有根据的。
- 事实二：从表面上看感知经验是通往真正信仰的可靠途径。
认识论者对它们的关系存在分歧。
在所有可能的世界W中，当且仅当（在某种程度上）导致或维持该信念的心理过程可靠地产生对W的真实信念时，信念在W中表面上在认识上是有保证的。
所谓的“内部主义者”不同意这种观点。他们否认成为通往真相的可靠途径对于保证是必要的，依靠“新邪恶恶魔”场景来证明他们的观点。3 这是标准版本：4
诺玛是一个普通的成年人，在正常的环境中具有正常的感知和认知能力。在公园里散步时，她对周围的环境形成了可靠、真实的感知信念。在她的世界里，感知是通向真理和知识的可靠途径。
维姬是诺玛在另一个可能世界中的心理复制品。从内部看，维姬和诺玛眼中的一切都一模一样。但维基并没有在公园里散步。相反，她漂浮在一桶营养物中，她的感觉系统连接到一台巨大的超级计算机。计算机通过诱导与诺玛相同类型的感知表征来欺骗维姬。这就是为什么一切（在感知上）在维姬看来和在诺玛看来是一样的，但在维姬周围的环境中，一切都不像看上去的那样。维基没有意识到也无法察觉这种欺骗，形成了严重错误的感知信念。在她的世界里，感知并不是通向真理和知识的可靠途径。
内在主义者的结论是，维琪的感性信念虽然存在大量错误，但仍然和诺玛的一样合理——“同样合理”。从表面上看感知经验，没有理由认为它不是了解情况真相的良好指南，这正是维基应该做的。这是对她的感性体验的正确或恰当的反应。如果维基的感知状态证明了她的感知信念，那么简单的可靠性主义就没有机会。这就是为什么它被称为新邪魔问题。
[R]可靠性与认知论证无关……[B]信念是合理的，因为信徒“正确推理”（广义上的“推理”[其中感知经验是广义上的原因，因此感知信念的形成是一种推理]）。如果一个人做出了所有正确的认知行动，那么无论这个信念是否错误，或者大自然是否合谋使这种推理变得不可靠，这个人都是合理的。（波洛克和克鲁兹，1999：113-114）。
如果正如内在主义者所假设的那样，正当性强烈地依赖于个人的（非事实的）心理状态和关系，但感性信念的可靠性是一个偶然的事实问题，那么正当性本身与可靠性或真理无关。内在主义者说，既然我们的第一个事实必然是正确的，那么第二个事实就与认识论论证无关。根据内在主义者的说法，这就是新邪恶恶魔问题的寓意。难怪这么多内部论者如此轻易地用一句俏皮话来驳斥可靠性论。
我们将新邪恶恶魔问题归功于斯图尔特·科恩。科恩在亚利桑那大学读研究生时发现了这个问题，该大学一度是认识论宇宙的中心。Cohen 在 1983 年与 Keith Lehrer 合着的一篇论文中首次发表了这个问题（Lehrer and Cohen, 1983），然后在他的里程碑式论文“Justification and Truth”中进一步发展了该问题（Cohen, 1984；参见 Pollock, 1984；Foley, 1987）。新邪魔问题至今已有四十多年历史。
可靠主义者仍然没有被吓倒。以下是可靠性主义者的两种回应方式。
继欧内斯特·索萨（Ernest Sosa，2003）之后，我将第一个反应称为“英雄”反应。根据英勇的反应，内在论者只是错误地认为维姬的信念是合理的。这种反应始于认知保证的力量、作用或工作：成为通向真理和知识的良好途径。这就是认识论辩护成为认识论的原因。这样的论证本身就强烈地影响了信念形成过程的可靠性。但由于感知只是偶然可靠的（正如恶魔世界的案例生动地说明的那样），感知正当性并不能强烈地影响个体的（非事实的）心理状态及其关系。这种观点认为，内在论者只是误解了认知论证的作用或力量。维基的感性信念显然是不合理的，因为它们没有机会成为现实。采取这一路线的哲学家包括桑福德·戈德堡（Sanford Goldberg，2012a）、5托马斯·塞纳（Thomas Senor，2013）和杰克·莱昂斯（Jack Lyons，2013）。6我将把这三位哲学家以及他们志同道合的同事称为“我们的英雄”。
我们的英雄虽然否认维基的信念在认识上是合理的，但通常承认她的信念是理性的，她的感性信念是理性持有的（Meyers，1988；Lyons，2013）。他们认为，这常常解释了内在主义者的“直觉”，即维基的感性信念与诺玛的一样“合理”，因为许多内在主义者倾向于互换使用“正当性”和“理性”（例如Cohen，1984：283 ； Foley，1987；Huemer，2001：19；Smithies，2012：274；Wedgwood，2012：280；Dogramaci，2015：777；参见 Siscoe，2021；Sylvan，女士）。但是，一旦我们将认识论论证（在通往真理和知识的良好途径的意义上）与结构理性分开，我们就不应该那么快地判断维基的信念在认识论上是合理的。7
这是第一个回应。我将第二种称为“特殊情况”反应。根据这一回应，维姬的信念在认识论上是合理的，尽管她的感知表征事实上（“原位”）并不可靠。它们在认识论上是合理的，因为她的感知表征（她的感知信念形成过程）在一组特殊的情况下是可靠的。这种想法认为，这是因为它们在特殊情况下是可靠的，即使个人不处于特殊情况下，它们也会继续为感知信念提供认知依据。因为维姬的感知信念形成过程在特殊情况下是可靠的，所以即使维姬一动不动地漂浮在一桶营养物质中，它们也会产生认知上合理的信念。
我将用本文的大部分篇幅来讨论这一回应。为了使这种反应发挥作用，它必须至少指定认知论证的“正确”必要和充分条件。但它还必须指定适当深入或具有启发性的条件。换句话说，这种反应不仅必须正确预测维基的感性信念是合理的，而且还必须解释为什么会这样。
过去五十年来最有影响力的三位哲学家——阿尔文·戈德曼、欧内斯特·索萨和泰勒·伯格——都在追求特殊环境反应的版本。这是党的路线。在本文的前半部分，我将批评他们各自的回应版本。下半年我会发展自己的。第二部分的重点是对恶魔世界场景中的合理信念提出最可信的可靠性解释。结束时我将回到我们的英雄身上。
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