Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one’s belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying on an overly pragmatic account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. Instead, I suggest that the sources of basic epistemic justification are those belief-forming methods which are indispensable for zetetically indispensable projects, that is, projects which are constitutive of being a successful inquirer for embodied, agential creatures like ourselves.

稳健的元规范现实主义者认为，存在着不可简化的规范性、形而上学的沉重规范性事实。人们可能想知道我们如何在认识论上证明这些事实的存在。在本文中，我对这个问题提供了一个答案：一个人对存在可靠的真实规范事实的信念在认识论上是合理的，因为这种信念对于成为像我们这样的生物的成功探究者是必不可少的。该论证建立在以诺（Enoch，2007，2011）关于稳健现实主义的深思熟虑的不可或缺性论证的基础上，但避免依赖于对基本认识论正当性来源的过于务实的解释。相反，我认为基本认知论证的来源是那些信念形成方法，这些方法对于zetetically不可缺少的项目来说是必不可少的，也就是说，这些项目是成为像我们这样的具身的、代理的生物的成功探究者的构成要素。