I issue a challenge for the view that deciding‐to‐A is rendered intentional by an intention or other pro‐attitude towards deciding. Either such an attitude cannot rationalize my deciding specifically to A for a reason I take to support doing A, or, fixing for this, cannot accommodate deciding without entertaining alternatives. If successful, the argument motivates the search for an account that does not source the intentionality of deciding in a rationalizing pro‐attitude.

中文翻译：

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根据描述做出决定

我对这样一种观点提出了质疑，即决定 A 是通过意图或其他支持决定的态度而有意为之的。要么这样的态度不能使我因为支持做A而专门做出A的决定合理化，要么，解决这个问题，不能在没有有趣的选择的情况下做出决定。如果成功，这个论点就会激发对一种解释的探索，这种解释并不源于理性化支持态度中决策的意向性。