I examine Du Châtelet's methodology for physics and metaphysics through the lens of her engagement with Newton's Rules for Reasoning in Natural Philosophy. I first show that her early manuscript writings discuss and endorse these Rules. Then, I argue that her famous published account of hypotheses continues to invoke close analogues of Rules 3 and 4, despite various developments in her position. Once relevant experimental evidence and some basic constraints are met, it is legitimate to inductively generalize from observations; general hypotheses can thereafter be assumed as true until contrary experiments show otherwise. I conclude by arguing that this account of induction plays an essential role in her metaphysics, both in an argument for simple substances—which has an inductive premise—and in her attempt to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable metaphysical commitments.

中文翻译：

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Du Châtelet、归纳法和牛顿推理规则

我通过杜夏特莱对自然哲学中牛顿推理规则的参与来审视她的物理学和形而上学方法论。我首先表明她的早期手稿著作讨论并认可了这些规则。然后，我认为，尽管她的立场取得了各种进展，但她著名的已发表的假设描述仍然引用了规则 3 和规则 4 的相似之处。一旦满足了相关的实验证据和一些基本约束，就可以从观察中归纳归纳；此后，一般假设可以被假定为正确，直到相反的实验表明不然。我的结论是，这种归纳解释在她的形而上学中发挥着重要作用，无论是在对简单实体的论证（具有归纳前提）中，还是在她试图区分可接受和不可接受的形而上学承诺时。