This essay disambiguates the relationship between phenomenology and explanation, whereby we uncover a fundamentally new way to understand the function of phenomenology within the sciences. These objectives are accomplished in two stages. First, we propose an original way to interpret Husserl's claim that his phenomenology is non‐explanatory. We demonstrate, contra accepted interpretations, that Husserl did not think phenomenology is non‐explanatory, because it is descriptive or because it does not deal with causes. Instead, we demonstrate that Husserl concluded that phenomenology is non‐explanatory, because it engages in a dialectical process of conceptual clarification. To substantiate this interpretation, we examine how Husserl understood the function of explanation in three different tiers of standard science and how he grasped the role of phenomenology in pure logic. Having properly clarified Husserl's conclusion—that phenomenology is non‐explanatory—we then execute our second task, namely to challenge just that idea. We argue that Husserl has—despite his claims to the contrary—de facto and inadvertently described his phenomenology as an explanatory nomological science. Our paper therefore not only clears up a longstanding misinterpretation of Husserl, but opens a new area of debate concerning the status of phenomenology within the scientific nexus.

中文翻译：

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现象学是解释性的：科学与元科学

本文消除了现象学与解释之间的关系，从而揭示了一种理解现象学在科学中的功能的全新方法。这些目标分两个阶段实现。首先，我们提出一种原始的方式来解释胡塞尔的主张，即他的现象学是非解释性的。与公认的解释相反，我们证明胡塞尔并不认为现象学是非解释性的，因为它是描述性的或因为它不处理原因。相反，我们证明胡塞尔的结论是现象学是非解释性的，因为它参与了概念澄清的辩证过程。为了证实这种解释，我们研究胡塞尔如何理解解释在三个不同层次的标准科学中的功能，以及他如何把握现象学在纯逻辑中的作用。在正确澄清了胡塞尔的结论——现象学是非解释性的——之后，我们执行第二个任务，即挑战这个想法。我们认为胡塞尔——尽管他有相反的说法——事实上并且无意中将他的现象学描述为一门解释性的法则科学。因此，我们的论文不仅澄清了长期以来对胡塞尔的误解，而且开启了一个关于现象学在科学联系中的地位的新辩论领域。