Maria Rosa Antognazza's work has issued a historical challenge to the thesis that the analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) attacked by epistemologists from Gettier onwards was indeed the standard view traditionally upheld from Plato onwards. This challenge led to an ongoing reappraisal of the historical significance of intuitive knowledge, in which the knower is intimately connected to what is known. Such traditional accounts of intuition, and their accompanying claims to epistemological primacy, constituted the precise target of Moritz Schlick's critique. Schlick engages with this topic throughout his oeuvre, from some of his early epistemological writings, to his anti‐metaphysical stance as a leading Logical Empiricist. Schlick crucially distinguishes knowledge from mere acquaintance, denying that the latter has epistemic status. He therefore argues that the very notion of ‘intuitive knowledge’ is a contradictio in adjecto.

中文翻译：

---

石里克、直觉和认识论的历史

玛丽亚·罗莎·安托格纳扎（Maria Rosa Antognazza）的著作对这一论点提出了历史性的挑战，即自盖蒂尔以来认识论所攻击的知识分析（作为正当的真实信仰）确实是自柏拉图以来传统上坚持的标准观点。这一挑战导致人们不断重新评估直觉知识的历史意义，其中认识者与已知事物密切相关。这种对直觉的传统描述，以及随之而来的认识论至上性主张，构成了莫里茨·施利克批评的精确目标。Schlick 在他的整个作品中都涉及这个主题作品从他早期的一些认识论著作，到他作为领先的逻辑经验主义者的反形而上学立场。施里克至关重要地将知识与单纯的认识区分开来，否认后者具有认知地位。因此，他认为“直觉知识”的概念本身就是一种形容词矛盾。