Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate a sympathetic reconsideration.

中文翻译：

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认识第一

伯特兰·罗素的认识论有一个有趣的结构特征，那就是它创造了命题知识（“S知道p”）不对称地依赖于罗素所说的因熟识而得知识。根据这种观点，一个缺乏熟人知识的主体将无法知道p为了任何p。自罗素以来，几乎没有人捍卫过这一点，在本文中，我发起了一次同情的重新考虑。