It is often argued that oppression reduces freedom. I argue against the view that oppression is wrong because it reduces freedom. Conceiving oppression as wrong because it reduces freedom is at odds with recognizing structural cases of oppression, because (a) many cases of oppression, including many structural ones, do not reduce agents’ freedom, and (b) the type of freedom reduction involved in many structural instances of oppression is not morally objectionable. If the mechanisms of oppression are sometimes indistinguishable from benign, or even ineluctable, processes of social shaping, arguments that oppression is objectionably freedom-reducing risk implausibly suggesting that socialization itself is objectionably freedom-reducing. I show how three strategies for explaining how oppression reduces freedom either fall into the trap of overgenerality, or end up appealing to values other than freedom to avoid it. I conclude by suggesting that oppression might be better thought of as an affront to equality.

人们经常认为压迫会减少自由。我反对这样一种观点，即压迫是错误的，因为它减少了自由。因为压迫减少了自由而认为压迫是错误的，这与认识结构性压迫的情况是不一致的，因为（a）许多压迫情况，包括许多结构性压迫，并没有减少行动者的自由，以及（b）涉及的自由减少类型许多结构性的压迫实例在道德上并不令人反感。如果压迫机制有时与良性的、甚至是不可避免的社会塑造过程无法区分，那么关于压迫是令人反感的自由减少风险的论点就令人难以置信地表明，社会化本身就是令人反感的自由减少。我将展示三种解释压迫如何减少自由的策略，要么落入过于笼统的陷阱，要么最终诉诸自由以外的价值观来避免自由。最后我建议，最好将压迫视为对平等的侮辱。