In this paper, I defend a tripartite metaphysics of intentional mental states, according to which mental states are divided into subject, content, and attitude, against recent attempts at eliminating the attitude component (e.g., Montague, Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, 2022, 2, Oxford University Press). I suggest that a metaphysics composed of only subject and content cannot account for (a) multisensory perceptual experiences and (b) phenomenological differences between episodes of perception and imagination. Finally, I suggest that some of the motivations behind the rejection of the attitude component can be accommodated within the tripartite framework.

中文翻译：

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捍卫（感性）态度

在本文中，我捍卫意向心理状态的三重形而上学，根据该理论，心理状态分为主体、内容和态度，反对最近消除态度成分的尝试（例如，蒙塔古，牛津心灵哲学研究，2022 ，2，牛津大学出版社）。我认为仅由主题和内容组成的形而上学无法解释（a）多感官知觉体验和（b）感知和想象片段之间的现象学差异。最后，我建议拒绝态度成分背后的一些动机可以在三方框架内得到解决。