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Why Perceptual Experiences cannot be Probabilistic
The Philosophical Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-02-16 , DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae014
Matteo Colombo 1 , Nir Fresco 2
Affiliation  

Perceptual Confidence is the thesis that perceptual experiences can be probabilistic. This thesis has been defended and criticised based on a variety of phenomenological, epistemological, and explanatory arguments. One gap in these arguments is that they neglect the question of whether perceptual experiences satisfy the formal conditions that define the notion of probability to which Perceptual Confidence is committed. Here, we focus on this underexplored question and argue that perceptual experiences do not satisfy such conditions. But if they do not, then ascriptions of perceptual confidence are undefined; and so, Perceptual Confidence cannot be true.

中文翻译:

为什么感知体验不能是概率性的

感知置信度是指感知体验可以是概率性的。这篇论文受到了基于各种现象学、认识论和解释性论证的辩护和批评。这些论点中的一个缺陷是,他们忽略了知觉经验是否满足定义知觉置信度所致力于的概率概念的形式条件的问题。在这里,我们关注这个尚未充分探索的问题,并认为感知体验不满足这些条件。但如果他们不这样做,那么感知信心的归属就没有定义。因此,感知信心不可能是真的。
更新日期:2024-02-16
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