Since the publication of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health in June of 2022, much attention has been paid to the direct effects of that decision on reproductive health care for pregnant or potentially pregnant individuals; and to the potential effects of the Court’s approach in Dobbs to other established precedent related to privacy and autonomy, such as rights to contraception and marriage equality. This Article will explore another potential negative consequence of Dobbs; its potential effect on the constitutional parameters of the law of civil commitment and involuntary medication of the mentally ill.The foundational Supreme Court case establishing the parameters of the State’s right to involuntarily commit an individual to a mental institution was decided only two years after Roe v. Wade. In 1975, the Supreme Court in O’Connor v Donaldson held that an individual has a liberty interest in “prefer[ring] one’s home to the comforts of an institution,” and that a State could not, “without more,” confine a non-dangerous individual. The two-prong test of requiring a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness to one’s self or to others has remained the cornerstone of civil commitment law ever since.The language and analysis of O’Connor is similar to that of Roe, the abortion rights case overturned by Dobbs. In particular, the grounding of the right to avoid civil commitment in the individual liberty and privacy interests are common themes in the two cases. The current Court, in its decision in Dobbs, has cast substantial doubt on the continued vitality of that analysis; and one can easily imagine a reconceptualization of O’Connor along the lines of Dobbs that substantially alters the requirements for civil commitment. In particular, the reliance in Dobbs and other recent Supreme Court opinions on historical precedent as a linchpin of originalist analysis could lead the Court to search for justifications in colonial or 19th-century mental health practices, time periods which predate modern psychiatric science.This Article will explore the parallels in approach between Roe and O’Connor, and will suggest ways in which the post-Dobbs Supreme Court majority might disrupt the civil commitment status quo, including potential expansion of civil commitment or other detention of pregnant individuals for the protection of the fetus; and possible relaxation of the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment articulated in O’Connor.

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多布斯诉杰克逊妇女健康案对民事承诺法的潜在影响

自美国最高法院对多布斯诉杰克逊妇女健康案的裁决公布以来2022 年 6 月，该决定对怀孕或潜在怀孕个体生殖保健的直接影响受到广泛关注；以及法院的做法的潜在影响多布斯与隐私和自主权相关的其他既定先例，例如避孕权和婚姻平等权。本文将探讨另一个潜在的负面后果多布斯；它对民事收容法和精神病人非自愿治疗法的宪法参数的潜在影响。最高法院的基本判例确定了国家将个人非自愿送入精神病院的权利的参数，是在罗诉诉案两年后做出的裁决.韦德。 1975 年，最高法院奥康纳诉唐纳森案认为，个人“更喜欢自己的家，而不是舒适的机构”，并且国家不能“没有更多”地限制非危险个人。从那时起，要求表现出精神疾病和对自己或他人的危险性的双管齐下的测试一直是民事承诺法的基石。奥康纳的语言和分析类似于鱼子，堕胎权案被推翻多布斯。特别是，避免民事承诺的权利以个人自由和隐私利益为基础，是两起案件的共同主题。现任法院在其判决中多布斯，对这种分析的持续活力产生了很大的怀疑；人们可以很容易地想象一种重新概念化奥康纳沿着多布斯这极大地改变了民事承诺的要求。特别是，依赖于多布斯和其他最近最高法院关于历史先例作为原旨主义分析关键的意见可能会导致法院在殖民或19th- 世纪的心理健康实践，早于现代精神病学的时期。本文将探讨罗伊之间方法的相似之处和奥康纳，并将建议后处理的方法多布斯最高法院多数意见可能会破坏民事承诺的现状，包括可能扩大民事承诺或以其他方式拘留孕妇以保护胎儿；以及可能放宽民事承诺的危险性要求奥康纳。