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Smelling things
The Philosophical Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-02-07 , DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae009
Giulia Martina 1 , Matthew Nudds 2
Affiliation  

In this paper, we outline and defend a view on which in olfactory experience we can, and often do, smell ordinary things of various kinds—for instance, cookies, coffee, and cake burnings—and the olfactory properties they have. A challenge to this view are cases of smelling in the absence of the source of a smell, such as when a fishy smell lingers after the fish is gone. Such cases, many philosophers argue, show that what we perceive in olfactory experience are odour objects, and not ordinary things. On behalf of our opponent, we articulate a screening-off argument based on cases of lingering smells for the thesis that we do not smell ordinary things. We then develop an alternative account of these cases that is consistent with our view. In doing so, we call into question two claims that are typically built into the notion of an odour object.

中文翻译:

闻东西

在本文中,我们概述并捍卫了一种观点,即在嗅觉体验中,我们可以并且经常确实闻到各种普通事物的气味(例如饼干、咖啡和蛋糕燃烧物)以及它们所具有的嗅觉特性。对这种观点的挑战是在没有气味来源的情况下闻气味的情况,例如鱼消失后鱼腥味仍然存在。许多哲学家认为,这样的例子表明,我们在嗅觉体验中感知到的是气味物体,而不是普通的东西。我们代表我们的对手,根据挥之不去的气味的案例,阐述了一个筛选论点,以证明我们闻不到普通东西的论点。然后,我们对这些案例提出了与我们的观点一致的替代解释。在此过程中,我们对气味对象概念中通常内置的两个主张提出了质疑。
更新日期:2024-02-07
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